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Abstract 
 
This paper establishes some general principles of the rationale for development assistance 
in Middle Income Countries and then applies these principles to the operations of the 
World Bank. It then puts the argument through its paces for the specific case of India, 
which has just transitioned into middle income status. The main conclusions are as follows. 
Whether or not IBRD is “development assistance”, the rationale for its engagement in 
MICs flows from the objectives of poverty reduction and global spillovers. The key issue in 
deploying limited IBRD resources is not just its value added, but value added relative to the 
best alternative source of finance and technical assistance. Survey evidence suggests that 
MIC countries are aware of alternative sources, and have assessments of comparative 
advantage. My hypothesis, a gross generalization of course, is that the Bank’s comparative 
advantage is stronger the further away the location is from the centre, and the closer the 
activity is to the poor. I include environmental dimensions under this heading. Finally, to 
the extent that the Bank’s global objectives indicate a different pattern of engagement than 
country specific comparative advantage might suggest, then, effectively, these activities 
will have to be subsidized relative to others.  
  
                                                 
*
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1. Introduction 
According to the World Bank, as a country crosses a (2008) gross national income
1
 
threshold of $995, it moves from the category of “low-income” to “lower-middle-income”. 
As it further crosses $3,945, it is classified as “upper-middle-income.” Finally, at $12,195 
it crosses in to the “high-income” group.2 A related classification is that which identifies 
eligibility for IDA (concessional) loans and IBRD (non-concessional) loans. Using 2008 
values, $1,135 per capita income is the operational cut off for IDA-eligibility and the start 
of IBRD terms, and $6,725 is the trigger for initiating the process for graduation from 
IBRD lending (but this can take a long time). There are some “blend” countries that have 
both IDA and IBRD lending as a transitional arrangement. In this paper I take middle 
income country (MIC) to be one that is eligible for IBRD borrowing from the World Bank. 
 
Some country cases illustrate the different categories. Ghana, with a per capita 
income of $630 is low income status and IDA, and some way from crossing either 
threshold. South Africa, at $5820, is lower-middle-income and IBRD. Brazil, at $7,300 is 
decidedly in the upper-middle-income category and an IBRD borrower, as is Mexico at 
$9,900 (indeed, Mexico is a member of OECD). China began its relationship with the 
World Bank in low income status and IDA eligibility. With rapid economic growth it 
crossed the thresholds into blend status and now IBRD only status, as it transitioned from 
low income to the upper reaches of the lower-middle-income category, with per capita 
income touching $3,000. India also began in the low income status and IDA eligible 
category. It languished in this status for a long time because of its low rate of growth, but 
the sharp increase over the past two decades, and especially over the past decade, has taken 
it into the IDA-IBRD blend category, and now into the lower-middle-income category, at a 
per capita income of $1,040 in 2008. At current growth rates, India’s IDA eligibility will 
stop soon, and it will become a pure IBRD country. 
 
This paper asks, how should the World Bank and (MICs) relate to each other? What 
do the MICs get from the World Bank, and what does the World Bank get from the MICs? 
It should be immediately clear from the above that the MICs are a very diverse category—
ranging from those that have been MICs for a long time, including some that are in IBRD-
graduation territory, while others have just entered this category and face issues of 
transition into the category. India is one such country and I will pay particular attention to 
India in this paper. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I establish some general principles 
of the rationale for development assistance in MICs. Section 3 applies these principles to 
the operations of the World Bank. Section 4 gets even more specific, by considering the 
case of India. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
  
                                                 
1
 Using the Atlas method: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/world-bank-atlas-method   
2
 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups (as of 8.10.10) 
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2. Why Development Assistance for Middle Income Countries? 
 The threshold for middle-income country status is annual per capita income of 
$995, or $2.7 per person per day. The operational cutoff for IDA eligibility is $3.1 per 
person per day. Clearly, such a country has, on average, crossed internationally recognized 
poverty lines. At the top of the middle income range, income is in excess of $30 per person 
per day. What is the rationale for the use of scarce public resources as development 
assistance to such countries? 
  
There appear to be three main arguments for continuing development assistance to 
countries that have on average crossed the $2 per person per day poverty line—“pockets of 
poverty”, “spillover effects ”, and “knowledge transfer.” Let us take each one of these in 
turn. 
  
It is obvious that averages deceive. There are many people below $2 per day, even 
if the national average is well above this line. According to one estimate, for example, 70% 
of the world’s poor by the $2 per day line live in MICs (of course, China and India account 
for the lion’s share of these).3 Thus, clearly, there is sufficient inequality in the MICs that 
there are indeed pockets of poverty. In some countries, like India, the term “pockets” may 
mislead. Poverty is widespread despite the country attaining middle income status and the 
international status that might go with it. If the objective of development assistance is to 
help poor people rather than just poor countries, then there is a rationale for continued 
developed assistance despite the fact that the country on average is no longer poor. 
  
The difficulty arises because, one might well ask, why should northern taxpayers 
channel resources to the government of a non-poor country in order to help the poor of that 
country, when on the face of it the country itself does not appear to be willing to help its 
own poor—as shown by the fact that poverty persists despite middle income status? But 
this might be too stringent a line to take. A more realistic line is that while the government 
of the non-poor country would like to help its poor the political economy makes it difficult 
to release resources for this task—an external flow of funds could ease this constraint and 
thus lead to greater flows to the poor. A second argument in this vein is that the 
government has good intentions but lacks the knowledge on how best to tackle its pockets 
of poverty. Development assistance in the form of knowledge transfer (which requires 
financial resources, of course) helps in this regard.  
 
Finally, even if these arguments are accepted, it is not immediately clear what the 
financial and technical assistance should be targeted to, in order to help the poor in non-
poor countries—encouraging further growth in per capita income, or encouraging better 
distribution of the per capita income? This is of course a major debate in the literature. To 
the extent that there is a conventional wisdom in this area it is the balanced view espoused 
by the Growth Commission: 
 
“In short, we take the view that growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for 
broader development, enlarging the scope for individuals to be productive and 
                                                 
3
 World Bank (2007, endnote 1.2, p 119) 
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creative…..The Commission strongly believes that growth strategies cannot succeed 
without a commitment to equality of opportunity, giving everyone a fair chance to enjoy 
the fruits of growth. But equal opportunities are no guarantee of equal outcomes. Indeed, in 
the early stages of growth, there is a natural tendency for income gaps to widen. 
Governments should seek to contain this inequality, the Commission believes, at the 
bottom and top ends of the income spectrum. Otherwise, the economy’s progress may be 
jeopardized by divisive politics, protest, and even violent conflict. Again, if the ethical case 
does not persuade, the pragmatic one should.” (Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008, p. 7) 
 
 Even if only averages mattered, so that there was only concern about low income 
countries, there would be a case for development assistance to MICs if what happened 
there had the potential to affect negatively the prospects of low income countries. 
Assistance to MICs to prevent such spillovers would be akin to development assistance to 
the poorest countries, even if it wasn’t given directly to them. Thus assistance to MICs (for 
example, Brazil, India and China) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases would help on 
climate change, whose impacts, it has been argued, can affect the poorest in poor countries 
(for example, in Bangladesh). But notice that this is no longer an argument for general 
development assistance to aid general development in MICs. Rather, it is an argument for 
identifying specific spillovers and deploying targeted assistance to prevent them or to 
mitigate their consequences (unless it is argued that general development in MICs will 
indeed achieve these objectives). 
  
Knowledge transfer is the third reason why development assistance may have a 
rationale in a country which has crossed a poverty threshold in per capita income. Since 
countries below the poverty line might wish to emulate the success of those countries who 
have crossed this line, how this was done, and how the higher level of income is being 
maintained and enhanced, might have lessons for low income countries. There are many 
ways of achieving this knowledge transfer. One of them is continued engagement of 
development assistance agencies in the middle income countries, to garner and transmit 
these lessons to low income countries. Given the vast range of per capita incomes in the 
middle income category, this argument can be also marshaled to support engagement in 
upper middle income countries—this time to help lower middle income countries. 
  
The above is of course a variant of the spillover argument, couched in terms of 
positive spillovers. But the key transmission channels are not development in MICs and 
their consequences for poorer countries. The key transmission channel is the development 
agency. The argument requires the agency to be geared towards learning the lessons from 
MICs and using them in targeted fashion to help poorer countries. Moreover, the argument 
requires that the development agency be able to do this better than alternative mechanisms 
such as official bilateral exchanges as part of diplomatic relations, or private sector 
managed exchanges. 
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3. The World Bank and Middle Income Countries 
 My focus in this paper is the role in the MICs of the first and largest of the five 
components of the World Bank Group, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). As is well known, in contrast to the International Development 
Association (IDA) part of the World Bank, IBRD does not make concessional loans—at 
least not at the deep level of concessionality of IDA.
4
 IDA resources come from triennial 
replenishments of grant funds to a pool from donor nations. IBRD uses its financial 
strength, in the form of its reserves, its paid up and callable capital, and its effective senior 
creditor status, to borrow favorably in financial markets and on lend to its developing 
country members. In this sense, IBRD lending and assistance may not constitute 
development assistance on the spectrum from pure grants to pure market rate loans. Indeed, 
this is a point of some discussion and debate, it being argued that IBRD’s role as a financial 
intermediary has been “tainted” by the presence of the soft loan arm IDA. Indeed, wasn’t 
that the role for which John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White created the World 
Bank alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bretton Woods in 1944? 
 
 Some of this discussion is to be seen in light of the recent responses of the 
international community to the financial needs of the two Bretton Woods institutions—a 
commitment of close on a trillion dollars increase in support for the IMF, compared to a 
capital increase of only 5 billion dollars for the World Bank, and the latter having been 
much more difficult to achieve politically. Of course there are many reasons for these 
difficulties, including the reluctance of northern governments to give up voting power in 
return for capital injections from southern nations such as China and India. But the whole 
process and its outcome may strengthen the idea that northern governments view their 
capital contributions to IBRD through the same lens as they view their contributions to 
IDA
5
. If this is the case, then support for an institution which in turn supports countries like 
India, China and Mexico, seen now as competitors rather than deserving financial 
assistance, may be politically problematic. Continued support to IBRD may indeed then 
depend on the three pillars discussed in the previous section as justifying development 
assistance to MICs. 
 
 The lack of expansion of IBRD’s capacity to lend, and growth in MICs, has meant 
that IBRD flows are an ever small share of the MICs total investment—down from 1.2% in 
2005 to 0.6% in 2005.
6
 However, whatever the debate on the extent to which IBRD is or is 
not development assistance in the same fashion as IDA, IBRD’s own self evaluation is 
based on these same three pillars—pockets of poverty, negative spillovers and global 
                                                 
4
 The other three parts of the World Bank Group are the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which 
engages directly with the private sector, the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICISD). I will not discuss these components, nor the 
(important) issues of coordination across the World Bank Group. 
5
 As a comparison, IBRD’s equity is around $40 billion, which is about the same as a three year 
replenishment of IDA. 
6
 Independent Evaluation Group (2007), p xiv. Of course there was a spike in IBRD lending in 2008-9 
because of the global financial crisis, but I believe the pre crisis trend capture the medium term prospects for 
IBRD better. 
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public goods, and knowledge gain and transfer.
7
 Here is how the latest Financial Statement 
of IBRD begins: 
 
 “IBRD's main goals are promoting sustainable economic development and reducing 
poverty in its developing member countries. It pursues these goals primarily by providing 
loans, guarantees and related technical assistance for projects and for programs for 
economic reform.” (IBRD, 2009, p.3) 
 
Here is how a recent evaluation of the World Bank’s operations in MICs defines the 
additional scope of the evaluation over and above development and poverty reduction: 
 
 “[The Report] also spotlights three growing dimensions of the Bank Group’s role—
sharing knowledge across countries, engaging countries in global programs, and combining 
support to the public and private sectors.” (Independent Evaluation Group, 2007). 
 
 Accepting, then, the three dimensions of the rationale for World Bank engagement 
in MICs—poverty, spillovers and knowledge, how has the Bank actually done in this 
engagement? This question was asked and answered by the Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) of the World Bank in its 2007 report, which focused on Bank support to MICs over 
the decade 1995-2006. It is the most systematic assessment available of this issue, and one 
that is based on a range of quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence.
8
 The sources of 
evidence include: (i) a review of IEG’s own country assistance evaluations (CAEs) of the 
Bank’s programs in 43 MICs, (ii) a review of the its own evaluations of 1,500 Bank 
projects in MICs, (iii) filed assessments in seven countries based on in depth interviews 
with stakeholders in seven MICs, and (iv) a client survey with over 600 respondents from 
12 MICs.
9
 Based on this evidence, IEG’s “headline conclusions” are as follows: 
 
 “The World Bank’s support in fostering growth and reducing poverty has been 
appreciated by MICs and made a contribution to their considerable success in these major 
areas. But the Bank must become more effective on issues where its work has not yielded 
pronounced advancements, notably dealing with inequality, combating corruption, and 
protecting the environment….The Bank’s quality stamp—reflected in technical expertise, 
project design and supervision, and advisory services—has been a key strength. Its 
advisory work has been strong on diagnostics but would have greater impact if it 
concentrated more on specific local needs. The Bank could have done better in finding 
ways to increase synergy across the Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency…. Looking ahead, the Bank should continue its 
engagement with MICs, but it must depart from business as usual. To produce greater 
development benefits, it has to become more agile and needs to draw upon MICs’ own 
capacity much more systematically, connecting such capabilities to help low-income 
countries and to tackle global challenges. The Bank’s work has to more clearly demonstrate 
                                                 
7
 This line of defense is also mounted by De Ferranti (2006), in a riposte to “right wing” attacks on the World 
Bank and specifically the operations and even the raison d’être of IBRD. 
8
 I was an adviser to this report. 
9
 See IEG 2007, Box 1.2. 
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best practice to deliver impact beyond its limited direct role.” (Independent Evaluation 
Group, 2007, p. xxx). 
 
Of all the sources of evidence used, the client survey is novel and innovative, and I 
look at that evidence is some detail in what follows. The survey is of 656 respondents from 
12 MICs: Brazil, China, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Russia, 
South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. The response rate is 34% (range 20% to 50%), which 
is in the acceptable range for a survey of this type.
10
 The respondents are from Government 
(40%), Private Sector (20%), CSO (16%), Academia (10%), Media (9%), and Donors 
(4%). As will be seen below the sample size is too small for some finer grained questions, 
at a general level it is the first comprehensive perspective of WB engagement in MICs from 
the perspective of the countries themselves. 
 
At the most general level, client responses to World Bank effectiveness paint a 
fairly favorable picture. As is seen from Table 1, over 80% of the respondents find the 
Bank to be “Moderately Effective”, “Effective” or “Highly Effective”.11 However, the 
absolute levels of these numbers are less informative than their variation across categories 
of engagement. Thus Table 2 shows that client satisfaction with Bank engagement declines 
as we go from “Fostering Growth” to “Poverty Reduction” to “Addressing Inequality” to 
“Reducing Corruption.” Indeed, for “Reducing Corruption” IEG rates the bank’s 
performance, on the basis of the full range of evidence as “moderately unsatisfactory”.12 
 
However, these findings are focused on the Bank’s absolute performance. For a 
MIC facing multiple sources of finance and advice and for the Bank’s owners deciding on 
where best to allocate their resources, what is perhaps equally important is the Bank’s 
comparative advantage, relative to alternative sources of finance and advice.  It is of course 
important to know that the Bank’s overall value added is positive, which these client 
surveys and other pieces of IEG evidence seem to strongly suggest. It is also important to 
know whether the Bank’s value added is greater in activity A than in activity B. But the 
really assessment is how the bank compares with the best alternative in these two activities. 
Especially in a context where IBD resources are limited, if alternatives to the Bank in 
activity B are non-existent, whereas there are adequate substitutes in activity A, this would 
be an argument for deploying the Bank’s resources in activity A. 
 
There is some, limited, evidence on comparative advantage in the client survey. 
Table 3 shows how the Bank compares to alternative sources of finance and advice (official 
and private), by dimension of performance. Clearly, the Bank does well on quality in a 
general sense, but not as well on fit to country needs, and not as well again on 
responsiveness to change and ease of access to its support. Table 4 disaggregates as 
between different types of alternative sources, but at the expense of disaggregation on type 
of performance. It shows how the Bank is rated overall compared to other official agencies 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed discussion of the methodology, see Appendix B of Independent Evaluation Group (2007) 
11
 The Tables in this section are all derived from the detailed numbers given in Appendix C of Independent 
Evaluation Group (2007). In Table 2 I have aggregated the categories Moderately Effective, Effective and 
Highly Effective. 
12
 Independent Evaluation Group (2007), p. xv. 
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(regional development banks and bilateral development agencies) and compared to private 
capital. Again, the relative comparison is perhaps more informative than the absolute 
numbers. Clearly, the Bank has a stronger advantage relative to official agencies than 
relative to private capital. 
 
It would have been useful to have had the comparative advantage assessment 
disaggregated by alternatives to the Bank, by sector and dimension of performance. But 
information was not collected at this detailed level, and in any case the sample size would 
have been inadequate to get meaningful comparisons. However, the comparative advantage 
question was indeed asked for a specific type of Bank activity—Knowledge Services. 
Table 5 shows that the comparative advantage rankings are the same for Knowledge 
Services as for Overall—the Bank does better relative to official agencies than it does 
relative to private agencies. 
 
Let me thus pose the question again: Given limited IBRD resources, how should a 
MIC think about how to deploying them, by sector and by function, and how should the 
Bank’s owners think about deploying them in that country? For a country, the answer is 
clearly: engage the Bank in those locations/sectors/activities/ where the Bank’s 
contribution relative to the best alternative is greatest. This is of course country specific, 
but on an a priori basis I want to advance the hypothesis that it is in lagging regions/social 
sectors/ground level activities supporting the poorest that MICs do not have alternative 
sources of finance and technical support. Environmental issues are another example of such 
a class of activities. The Bank is likely to be better than alternative official sources in these, 
and the private sector is unlikely to be a viable alternative to the Bank in these areas. 
Again, these are not hard and fast conclusions and the specifics may point in other 
directions, but they are a start to a discussion about the nature of the Bank’s contribution—
what is important is to pose the question. 
 
The above hypothesis resonates with the first of the reasons for continued 
engagement with MICs—“pockets of poverty.” But it may need to be modified when the 
other two reasons are taken into account. The knowledge gain and transfer argument is 
potentially a powerful one for continued engagement in an activity even if the Bank does 
not have a strong comparative advantage in that country in that activity—because the 
knowledge gained could help the Bank support another country where the alternatives are 
not better than the Bank. The IEG client survey found that 40% of respondents though the 
Bank was “Moderately Effective” in “Sharing experiences from different countries”, 26% 
thought it was “Effective” and 9% thought it was “Highly Effective”.13 But this is 
knowledge transfer into MICs. On knowledge transfer from MICs to Low Income 
Countries (LICs) there is little in the way of direct evidence, although work on Conditional 
Cash Transfers is often mentioned as one example. 
 
The spillover and global public goods argument also points to a broader 
engagement than might be indicated by comparative advantage as seen by the country, on 
issues such as environment and finance, where there are strong spillover effects globally. 
Here is how the IEG evaluation summarizes its findings:  
                                                 
13
 IEG (2007), Table 4.1 on p. 38. 
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“Significant global programs, in which MICs account for half of participants, have 
received growing emphasis as part of the Bank’s engagement with MICs…. Bank 
involvement in global programs is not always highly recognized at the country level; nor is 
it particularly well integrated into its country programs…..Having an insufficient voice in 
global program governance is still a concern for MICs and may inhibit their enthusiasm for 
and engagement in such programs.” (Independent Evaluation Group, 2007, p.45). 
 
Thus the Bank does not get very high marks for using its engagement with MICs as 
a vehicle for advancing the cause of global public goods. Further, there is an issue which is 
not raised in the IEG report because it deals with truly global programs. Sometimes, 
however, a multi-country issue confined to a few countries within a region is claimed by 
the World Bank. The principle of subsidiarity would suggest that the first port of call 
should be a regional institution, perhaps a regional development bank (RDB), rather than 
the World Bank. There may be a case for temporary use of the World Bank because the 
RDB does not have the capacity to do so, but this is only an argument for strengthening the 
capacity of the RDB over the medium term, as argued in Kanbur (2005). The World Bank 
should be used for truly global, cross-regional spillover issues, and its engagement in MICs 
should be assessed in light of the contribution of the engagement to the global public goods 
objective. 
 
4. An Application to India 
 
 India is an interesting country in which to apply the general global level reasoning 
of the previous two sections. Indeed, when the IEG assessment was done, during 2006, 
India’s gross national income per capita was just below the middle income country cutoff 
at that time, so it did not make the cut for inclusion in the study, although it was a “blend” 
country receiving both IDA and IBRD support. But all that has changed. As stated in the 
introduction, India has now crossed the dividing line from LIC to MIC, and in fact has now 
crossed the IDA operational cutoff. IDA lending will be phased out over the next three 
years, leaving India as a pure IBRD country. 
 
 The transition out of IDA is only one aspect of the current conjuncture in the 
relationship between the World Bank and India. Earlier this year, India approached the so 
called single borrower limit (SBL) with IBRD, a total exposure of $15.5 billion dollars of 
outstanding debt. This ceiling has now been raised to $16.5 billion, but the basic issue will 
resurface when this ceiling is hit, or even before it is hit. With an exposure limit, net flows 
must be close to zero, and gross flows can only be as high as repayments. Thus India has in 
its own hands how much to generate in the way of gross flows—by accelerated 
repayments! Doing this, however, means that India sees a benefit in the gross flows that 
outweigh the costs of earlier repayment. In any event, gross flows are likely to be curtailed 
relative to the past.
 14
 
 
                                                 
14
 Another option, which is being discussed but whose future is unclear as of now, is for the Reserve Bank of 
India to invest in IBRD bonds, creating equivalent headroom for gross in flows. The same question would 
arise in this case—the benefits of the gross flows would have to exceed the opportunity cost of investing in 
IBRD bonds. 
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 The third and final aspect of the current conjuncture is that net flows from the 
World Bank have been an ever shrinking share of India’s economy, India’s budget and 
India’s current account. In India’s trillion dollar economy, an annual current account deficit 
of around 30 billion dollars, no binding foreign exchange constraint because of private 
capital inflows, and central government expenditures well in excess of 200 billion dollars 
per year, the net flows and even the gross flows that IBRD can generate for India are small 
indeed. This is very different from 20 years ago when the Indian economy was much 
smaller, IBRD net flows were larger, and there was a binding foreign exchange constraint. 
 
 Each of these features has an implication, for India and for the World Bank. First, 
both have to be careful of a mindset that is typical of IDA/IBRD blend countries, namely, 
“soft money for soft sectors, hard money for hard sectors.” This is indeed the division that 
is typically used, but the danger is that as the soft money runs out the mindset penalizes the 
social sectors, even when there is no soft money in play. Countries that have been IBRD 
for a long time do not have this issue—for them all money is hard and they do use some of 
it for the social sectors. Whatever else determines the amount going to social sectors, it is 
not the transition out of soft money. Presumably in ten years time that will the Indian 
mindset because India will have been a pure IBRD for a decade borrower for a decade, but 
a bias against social sectors is one to watch in the near term period immediately after the 
transition out of IDA. 
 
The cap on IBRD gross flows will force greater scrutiny on tradeoffs. Up to now, 
loosely speaking, there has been room for more of everything. And the smallness of IBRD 
gross flows relative to the total will mean that a “seat at the table” will come from technical 
excellence rather than financial clout. How might the Indian decision makers react to these 
new realities? How should they use IBRD resources, in which sectors, for what activities, 
and through which instruments—development policy loans (DPLs), which support 
government budget directly, investment loans which disburse against project expenditures, 
or technical assistance (also known as analytical and advisory activities, AAA).Indications 
are that they are increasingly engaged in thinking through how best to respond (other than 
working vigorously for a raise in the cap).Here are two possible models for them to 
consider as medium term targets: Mexico and China. 
 
For Mexico, a member of OECD but also an IBRD borrower, the overall 
relationship is well captured in the most recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
document: 
 
“The Bank and the government have agreed on an approach that would enhance the 
Bank’s effectiveness and responsiveness through a streamlined IBRD lending program, and 
an expanded program of analytic and advisory activities (AAA). Most lending would be 
consolidated into an annual Development Policy Loan (DPL) that supports the 
government’s own national development strategy. The AAA program will be carefully 
tailored to country demands and would respond rapidly to emerging opportunities.” (World 
Bank, 2008, p. i). 
 
An alternative approach is the one followed for the Government of China (GoC): 
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 “IBRD AAA and lending will apply international expertise to helping the GoC to 
complete the transition to a market economy, improve the welfare of the poor and near 
poor, and develop and implement sustainable resource-management practices…. Over the 
CPS period, it is expected that the Bank Group’s overall exposure to China will remain 
stable or grow slowly. IBRD lending is expected to range over $1.0 billion to 1.5 billion a 
year….” (World Bank, 2006, p. vi). 
 
For China the overall gross flows are also very small, but they have decided to take 
the flows across a range of even smaller projects. The staff time and oversight that comes 
with the gross flows are deployed across a range of activities where the Chinese think the 
technical input of the World Bank can have most benefit. Mexico has decided to take the 
gross flows together in the form of a direct injection to the budget, and access World Bank 
expertise through the AAA program, with some of these on a fee for service basis. 
 
Before discussing which model might suit India best, let me first of all characterize 
what I see as the contours of the Indian economic policy discourse which will frame these 
decisions. In the Indian policy making community, a concern for fast increases in average 
income (high growth) exists simultaneously with a concern about distribution around the 
average (equity, poverty). But the two concerns are separate, and instruments for each are 
also seen as being separate.
15
 Distributional concerns often flow from political imperatives; 
there is nothing wrong with that—large sums are now being devoted to these concerns. 
With this background, I believe that Indian economic policy makers will push 
simultaneously, but separately, for interventions and expenditures they believe to be pro-
growth on the one hand, and pro-distribution (“inclusion”) on the other. I would include 
environmental issues under the latter. Specifically, this will translate into a simultaneous, 
but separate, push for things like high end infrastructure, finance, research and 
development (including higher education) on the one hand (under the “growth” heading) 
and things like rural livelihoods, basic health, and urban slums on the other (under the 
“inclusion” umbrella).  
 
It is of course for the Government of India (GoI) to decide how best to deploy 
limited IBRD resources, judging the relative return to India from using the technical 
expertise embodied in the Bank’s gross flows, in location/sector/activity A rather than B. 
But here are some issues that will surely arise. With each issue I will also propose a 
hypothesis that might help to structure the discussion as we go forward. 
 
•  Is the WB’s comparative advantage (relative to alternative sources of finance and 
technical assistance) greater under the “growth” umbrella or under the “inclusion” 
umbrella? 
– Hypothesis: There are fewer credible alternatives to the Bank under the 
inclusion umbrella. 
                                                 
15
 I should say that I believe this characterization holds for economic policy makers in other countries, and in 
the economics profession more generally. See Kanbur (2001, 2002). 
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• Is this comparative advantage a function of how big the Bank’s financing is relative 
to the overall outlay in the project?  
– Hypothesis: Yes, size matters, with the implication that the comparative 
advantage will be less in large high end infrastructure and finance deals at 
the national level, and greater at the level of states focusing on the lives of 
the poor. 
• Is the WB best used as a partner in small pilots to test out innovative ideas, rather 
than as a partner in implementing nationwide or statewide programs? 
– Hypothesis: Alternative sources are unlikely to have such cross-country 
experience. If the WB’s claimed advantage is transference of international 
experience and lessons, surely this is best done through pilots, to first test if 
and how those lessons translate to the Indian context.  
• On AAA, is the Bank better used (relative to alternative sources) in doing “major” 
pieces of work with sustained in depth analysis addressing fundamental medium 
term issues, or is it better suited to doing short sharp pieces responding to policy 
issues of the day? 
– Hypothesis: For Indians, high quality sustained in-depth analysis, 
mobilizing analysts In India and outside, would be the Bank’s comparative 
advantage relative to alternative sources in the private sector.  
• Question for WB: If the disconnect between the growth and the inclusion streams in 
Indian discourse is accepted, and if the Bank thinks this connect is important, 
should the Bank more strongly advocate AAA and pilots that explore this linkage 
specifically for India? 
– Hypothesis: Yes, but receptiveness from the Indian policy making elite may 
be limited in the current mode of discourse. 
Two final points; First, the directions suggested by the hypotheses above are just 
that—directions. This is not a simple either-or issue. Rather, it is more a question of the 
stance or the tilt that the Indian government might or should take in its dealing with the 
World Bank. Second, to the extent that any of these country specific activities have a 
positive spillover for the world as a whole, it is unlikely that the Indian government would 
internalize that external benefit. This is something that the Bank itself will have to do, and 
encourage the adoption of these activities through effective subsidization in one way or 
another. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have considered the World Bank’s engagement with MICs from the 
perspective of development assistance, emphasizing comparative advantage. After 
exploring a general framework at the global level, I have presented an application to the 
specific case of India, which has a long standing relationship with the World Bank and has 
just transitioned into MIC status. Here are the five major conclusions of this paper: 
 
• Whether or not IBRD is “development assistance”, the rationale for its engagement 
in MICs flows from the objectives of poverty reduction and global spillovers. 
• The key issue in deploying limited IBRD resources is not just its value added, but 
value added relative to the best alternative source of finance and technical 
assistance. 
• Survey evidence suggests that MIC countries are aware of alternative sources, and 
have assessments of comparative advantage. 
• My hypothesis, a gross generalization of course, is that the Bank’s comparative 
advantage is stronger the further away the location is from the centre, and the closer 
the activity is to the poor. I include environmental dimensions under this heading.  
• Finally, to the extent that the Bank’s global objectives indicate a different pattern of 
engagement than country specific comparative advantage might suggest, then, 
effectively, these activities will have to be subsidized relative to others.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1
World Bank Client Response: Overall 
Effectiveness
Highly
Ineffective
Ineffective Moderately 
Ineffective
Moderately 
Effective
Effective Highly 
Effective
Overall 1% 4% 12% 53% 28% 2%
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Table 2
Effectiveness By Objective
Moderately Effective or Better
Fostering Growth 69%
Poverty Reduction 59%
Addressing Inequality 44%
Reducing Corruption 35%
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Table 3
Bank vs Others by Type of Performance
Worse Same Better
Quality 7% 34% 60%
Fit to country needs 18% 39% 43%
Responsiveness 
when country 
needs change
28% 34% 38%
Ease of access to 
support
32% 37% 31%
 
  
 17 
Table 4
Bank vs Official and Bank vs Private
Less Effective Same More Effective
Bank vs Other 
Official Agencies
21% 33% 45%
Bank vs Private 
Capital
43% 20% 37%
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Table 5
Bank vs Official and Bank vs Private for 
Knowledge Services
Less effective Same More effective
Bank vs Other
Official Agencies
10% 35% 55%
Bank vs
Professional 
advisers such as 
consultants and 
academics
24% 31% 45%
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